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  OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________ 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
      St. Francis Medical Center (SFMC) is a provider of 
health care services covered under Part A of Title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et. seq., which is commonly 
known as the Medicare Act.  SFMC appeals from a district court 
 
order dismissing its amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction  
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We affirm. 
  I. 
  
 A.  Before 1982, Medicare providers were reimbursed for 
the "reasonable cost" of covered services.  See Sacred Heart 
Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1992).  
"Under this regime, hospitals and other health care providers had 
little incentive to curb operating costs and render services more 
economically, for the federal government bore the financial 
burden of increases."  Id. (footnote omitted).  "In 1982, 
Congress determined that the Medicare Program should be modified 
to provide hospitals with better incentives to render services 
more economically.  Accordingly, in the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) Congress amended the [Social 
Security Act] by imposing a ceiling on the rate of increase of 
inpatient operating costs recoverable by a hospital."  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
 "Under TEFRA, a hospital may receive no more than the 
`target amount' of per patient costs."  St. Francis 
Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 1110, 1111 (3d Cir. 
1992) (St. Francis I).   The statute provided:  
"`target amount' means with respect to a hospital for a 
particular 12-month cost reporting period -- (i) in the 
case of the first reporting period for which this 
subsection is in effect, the allowable operating costs 
of inpatient hospital services . . . recognized . . . 
for such hospital for the preceding 12-month cost 
reporting period."  [42 U.S.C. §] 1395ww(b)(3)(A).  For 
  
each reporting period subsequent to the initial period, 
the target amount was increased by a specified 
percentage.  Section 1395ww(b)(3)(A).  Under this 
system, hospitals were obligated to absorb operating 
costs in excess of their target amounts, but they 
received bonuses if their operating costs were less 
than their targeted amounts.  Section 1395ww(b)(1)(A).   
 
Sacred Heart Medical Ctr., 958 F.2d at 540.  
 TEFRA also directed the Secretary to provide for 
exemptions from, and exceptions or adjustments to, the TEFRA 
limits (see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)), and the Secretary has 
done so.  Before 1991, 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g) (1990), which bore 
the heading "Exceptions," permitted the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA)1 to "adjust a hospital's operating costs . 
. . upward or downward" if the hospital could "show that it 
incurred unusual costs (in either a cost reporting period subject 
to the ceiling or the hospital's base period) due to 
extraordinary circumstances beyond its control" (42 C.F.R. § 
413.40(g)(2) (1990)) or if the hospital had experienced a change 
in its "case mix" (42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g)(3) (1990)).  In 
addition, 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(h), which bore the heading 
"Adjustments," provided in pertinent part: 
                     
1
.  The Secretary has delegated considerable administrative 
responsibility for the Medicare Program to the HCFA.  See Sacred 
Heart Medical Ctr., 958 F.2d at 540 n.4. 
  
 HCFA may adjust the amount of the operating costs 
considered in establishing cost per case for one or 
more cost reporting periods, including both periods 
subject to the ceiling and the hospital's base period, 
to take into account factors that could result in a 
significant distortion in the operating costs of 
inpatient hospital services. 
 
42 C.F.R. § 413.40(h)(1) (1990). 
 In 1991, these provisions were combined to form what is 
now 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g) (1993).  Under this provision, the HCFA 
"may adjust the amount of the operating costs considered in 
establishing the rate-of-increase ceiling for one or more cost 
reporting periods, including both periods subject to the ceiling 
and the hospital's base period, under the circumstances specified 
below."  Subsequent provisions state that such adjustments may be 
granted for essentially the same reasons listed in the previous 
version of the regulations.  See 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g)(2)-(3) 
(1993).2   
                     
2
.  These provisions state: 
 
 (2)  Extraordinary circumstances.  HCFA may make an 
adjustment to take into account unusual costs (in 
either a cost reporting period subject to the ceiling 
or the hospital's base period) due to extraordinary 
circumstances beyond the hospital's control.  These 
circumstances include, but are not limited to, strikes, 
fire, earthquakes, floods, or similar unusual 
occurrences with substantial cost effects. 
 
 (3)  Comparability of cost reporting periods -- (i) 
Adjustment for distortion.  HCFA may make an adjustment 
to take into account factors that would result in a 
significant distortion in the operating costs of 
inpatient hospital services between the base year and 
the cost reporting period subject to the limits. 
  
 The Secretary now interprets 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g) 
(1993) to mean that a provider may obtain two different types of 
"base period inpatient operating cost adjustments."  Appellees' 
Br. at 7.  According to the Secretary, the first type is "cost 
year-specific" and may raise a provider's target amount for the 
purpose of recovering that year's costs but not for the purpose 
of calculating bonus payments.  Id. at 7-9.  The second type of 
adjustment, the Secretary explains, results in "a permanent 
adjustment to the base period inpatient operating costs used to 
calculate the TEFRA limit," and "any permanent increase in the 
limit would come into play under the TEFRA bonus provision 
beginning only with the fiscal year after the one for which any 
permanent base period relief [is] granted."  Id. at 8-9.  SFMC 
argues vigorously that the Secretary's recognition of this second 
type of adjustment represents a recent change in position that 
was taken for purposes of litigation. 
 In 1983, Congress largely replaced the TEFRA system 
with a "prospective payment system" (PPS) (see Sacred Heart 
Medical Ctr., 958 F.2d at 540), but certain types of hospitals 
and hospital units were excluded from the PPS.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(b), and (d)(1)(A)-(B); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.20(b), 412.22(b).  
Among the excluded units were distinct part rehabilitation units.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(B); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.23, 412.30. 
 B.  SFMC operates a general acute-care hospital that 
includes a rehabilitation unit.  For TEFRA purposes, the 
  
hospital's base period ended on June 30, 1985.  During this 
period, SFMC's fiscal intermediary concluded that SFMC did not 
have a distinct part rehabilitation unit under the applicable 
regulations "since less than 75% of its patients required 
intensive rehabilitation.  The intermediary terminated the 
provider as a distinct part rehabilitation unit and the Health 
Care Financ[ing] Administration . . . upheld that decision.  To 
comply with the 75% rule, the Medical Center transferred some of 
its `non-qualifying' patients from the rehabilitation unit to its 
acute care facility.  This transfer was completed in the year 
ending July 30, 1986 . . . ."  St. Francis I, 962 F.2d at 1112.  
Because this transfer was not completed until after the base 
period ended, SFMC maintains,  
 certain "non-qualifying" patients were included on the 
original 1985 cost report for the Medical Center's 
rehabilitation unit, but then were transferred out of 
that unit by 1986.  The absence of these "non-
qualifying" patients from the group of patients treated 
by the unit in 1986 meant that the Medical Center's 
average patient costs were higher in 1986 than the 
estimates of those costs derived from the 1985 base 
year cost report.  In addition, the base year cost 
report did not include costs associated with a physical 
expansion project completed in 1986.    
 
Id. at 1113. 
 SFMC sought relief under 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g) and (h) 
for the cost reporting period ending June 30, 1986.  Although the 
intermediary recommended partial relief, the HCFA denied SFMC's 
requests.  The HCFA concluded that SFMC's transfer of 
nonqualifying patients out of the rehabilitation unit after the 
  
base period did not constitute "an extraordinary circumstance 
beyond the hospital's control" but resulted from a "management 
decision" to claim the transferred patients as rehabilitation 
cases in the base year.  App. at 24-25.  The HCFA also concluded 
that an adjustment was not warranted by the hospital's building 
program.  Id. at 24-25.  The HCFA noted that expansion is usually 
undertaken to accommodate "increased utilization," which in turn 
tends to "offset any impact on a target rate."  Id. at 24.  
However, in SFMC's case, the HCFA observed, "while an expansion 
program was being implemented, the size of the rehabilitation 
unit was being decreased."  Id. 
 SFMC appealed to the Provider Reimbursement Review 
Board (PRRB), but the PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal because, among other things, SFMC had not 
satisfied the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement in 42 
U.S.C. § 1395oo(f).  The PRRB wrote: 
 Under Section 1878(a) Title XVIII, Social Security Act, 
as amended, [42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)], and 42 C.F.R. 
405.1835 and 1841, a provider has a right to a hearing 
before the Board with respect to costs claimed on a 
timely filed cost report if it is dissatisfied with the 
final determination of the intermediary . . . , and the 
amount in controversy is $10,000, or more, and the 
request for hearing was filed within 180 days of the 
date of the final determination . . . .  [T]he amount 
in controversy for the issues you wish to raise is less 
than $10,000.  Since the above statutory requirement is 
a prerequisite to a provider's right to a hearing, the 
Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction over 
this appeal and hereby dismisses the appeal of the 
subject year. 
 
  
App. at 32.3 
 
   SFMC then filed this action in district court.  
Asserting that the district court had jurisdiction under 42 
U.S.C. § 1395oo(f), SFMC's complaint alleged that the PRRB had 
"wrongfully declined jurisdiction" and that the fiscal 
intermediary and the HCFA had erred in denying SFMC's requests 
"to amend and/or reopen its 1985 cost report."  App. at 62.  The 
complaint sought a declaration that the intermediary, the HCFA, 
and the PRRB had acted improperly.  Id.  In addition, the 
complaint requested that the court order that SFMC be given 
permission to amend its 1985 cost report; that the intermediary, 
the HCFA, and the PRRB "recalculate [SFMC's] base year cost per 
discharge in accordance with its amended cost report"; and that 
SFMC be awarded "the sums due it pursuant to the amended cost 
                     
3
.  While the PRRB denied jurisdiction over SFMC's claims for 
fiscal year 1985, it exercised jurisdiction over SFMC's claims 
for fiscal year 1986.  These claims were settled, and SFMC was 
granted reimbursement for its full inpatient operating costs for 
fiscal years 1986 through 1988.  App. at 36, 46-50; Appellant's 
Br. at 12.  This reimbursement totalled $1,117,355.  App. at 37- 
38.  With respect to bonus payments, the settlement stated: 
 
 The Provider agrees that no exception awarded under 42 
C.F.R. 413.40(g) by virtue of this settlement or any 
HCFA decision related to the capital expansion program 
shall entitle the Provider to any TEFRA incentive 
payments or other payments in excess of final audited 
costs.  The parties make no agreement with respect to 
the appropriateness of any TEFRA incentive payments or 
other payments in excess of final audited costs should 
an adjustment be awarded under 42 C.F.R. 413.40(h). 
 
Id. at 39-40.  SFMC subsequently dismissed its 1986 PRRB appeal.  
Id. at 259.  
  
report, together with interest thereon" and attorney's fees.  Id. 
at 62-63.   
 The Secretary moved to dismiss the case for lack of 
jurisdiction, contending that SFMC had not met the $10,000 
amount-in-controversy requirement in 42 U.S.C. §1305oo(f).  The 
magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred rejected this 
argument and therefore recommended that this motion be denied and 
that the case be remanded to the PRRB.  The magistrate judge did 
not find that SFMC was seeking to recover $10,000 or more for the 
cost reporting period at issue, i.e., the period ending on June 
30, 1986.  Instead, the magistrate judge concluded: 
 The PRRB attempts to isolate each year involved to 
determine whether it meets the $10,000.00 requirement, 
but the claim requires the board to look at the years 
1985 through 1988 as a whole because they are 
inextricably connected, since the base year is the 
foundation for a continuing inaccuracy in plaintiff's 
reimbursements from Medicare.  Plaintiff easily meets 
the $10,000.00 jurisdictional amount as defined in 42 
C.F.R. Section 405.1839(a)(2) for the years l986, 1987 
and 1988, for which the TEFRA rate of increase limits 
are determined by the 1985 cost report.  It is 
unreasonable and inefficient to require plaintiff to 
file annually for an exception to the TEFRA limits when 
a recalculation of the base year cost report, if proven 
to be inaccurate, would obviate the problem. 
 
App. at 71-72.  The district court accepted the magistrate 
judge's recommendation. 
 On appeal, a divided panel of our court reversed and 
held that SFMC had not satisfied the $10,000 amount-in- 
controversy requirement.  Noting that "[t]he `amount in 
controversy' is defined by [42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i)] as 
  
`the amount of total program reimbursement due to the provider 
for the items and services furnished to individuals for which 
payment may be made . . . for the period covered by such 
report,'" the panel held that a single provider may not 
"aggregate claims over several cost reports in order to satisfy 
the amount in controversy requirement of § 1395oo(a)."  St. 
Francis I, 962 F.2d at 1114, 1115 (emphasis supplied in St. 
Francis I).  However, in response to SFMC's argument that the 
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the panel 
remanded the case to the district court so that SFMC could 
petition for leave to amend its complaint to assert jurisdiction 
under that provision.  962 F.2d at 1117.  In doing so, however, 
the panel made clear that it was not deciding whether SFMC's 
claims could "properly be asserted under this jurisdictional 
provision."  Id. at 1117 n.10.   
 On remand, SFMC was granted leave to file an amended 
two-count complaint that asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  Count I of the amended complaint alleged: 
    The methodology, or lack of methodology, utilized by 
HCFA to deny to St. Francis Medical Center a base year 
adjustment (to achieve comparability between cost 
reporting periods) has resulted in HCFA's imposition of 
improper and unreasonable reimbursement ceilings (TEFRA 
Ceilings) upon the Medical Center's rehabilitation 
unit.   
 
App. at 212.  Count II alleged that SFMC's equal protection 
rights had been violated because it had been treated differently 
from providers "whose post-base year costs for post-base year 
  
cost reporting periods . . . are undistorted."  Id. at 213.  
Counts I and II of the amended complaint sought essentially the 
same relief as SFMC's prior complaint.  Id. at 213-15.   
 The defendants moved to dismiss, and the magistrate 
judge recommended that the motion be granted on the ground that 
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded the exercise of jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The district court agreed and dismissed the 
amended complaint.  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
 Under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1), a 
provider has "the right to obtain judicial review of any final 
decision" of the PRRB by means of a civil action filed in 
district court.  In St. Francis I, however, our court held that 
SFMC could not obtain judicial review under this provision 
because it had not satisfied the $10,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a).  SFMC thus turned to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 as an alternative avenue for obtaining review, but 
SFMC's reliance on this provision raises other jurisdictional 
problems. 
 The Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii, incorporates 42 
U.S.C. § 405(b), which provides in relevant part: 
   The findings and decision of the Secretary after a 
hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were 
parties to such hearing.  No findings of fact or 
decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any 
person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as 
herein provided.  No action against the United States, 
the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall 
  
be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to 
recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (emphasis added).  Therefore, if SFMC's 
amended complaint seeks "to recover on [a] claim arising under 
[the Medicare Act]," this provision deprives the district court 
of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 As the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, 
resolution of this jurisdictional issue requires us to consider 
two lines of Supreme Court precedent:  the "Salfi-Ringer line" 
and the "Erika-Michigan Academy line."  See National Kidney 
Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 966 (1993).  We will consider each of 
these lines separately. 
 A.  If the "Salfi-Ringer line" controls, the decision 
of the district court dismissing SFMC's complaint was clearly 
correct.  In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Court 
considered an action brought on behalf of a class of persons who 
had been denied Social Security benefits pursuant to a provision 
of the Social Security Act that permitted a widow or stepchild to 
obtain benefits only if that claimant had become the wife or 
stepchild of the deceased at least nine months before his death.  
A three-judge court held that this statutory requirement was 
unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court concluded that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(h) deprived the lower court of jurisdiction to entertain 
the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The Court rejected the 
proposition that section 405(h) merely requires exhaustion of 
  
administrative remedies (422 U.S. at 757), as well as the 
argument that the plaintiffs' claims arose under the Constitution 
rather than the Social Security Act.  Id. at 760.  The Court 
wrote: 
 It would, of course, be fruitless to contend that 
appellees' claim is one which does not arise under the 
Constitution, since their constitutional arguments are 
critical to their complaint.  But it is just as 
fruitless to argue that this action does not also arise 
under the Social Security Act.  For not only is it 
Social Security benefits which appellees seek to 
recover, but it is the Social Security Act which 
provides both the standing and the substantive basis 
for the presentation of their constitutional 
contentions.  Appellees sought, and the District Court 
granted, a judgment directing the Secretary to pay 
Social Security benefits.  To contend that such an 
action does not arise under the Act whose benefits are 
sought is to ignore both the language and the substance 
of the complaint and judgment.  This being so, the 
third sentence of § 405(h) precludes resort to federal-
question jurisdiction for the adjudication of 
appellees' constitutional contentions. 
 
Id. at 760-61.  The Court thus held that individuals wishing to 
challenge the duration-of-relationship requirement were required 
to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  See 422 U.S. at 763-67. 
 In Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984), the 
plaintiffs were individuals who wanted Medicare to pay Part A 
benefits4 for a surgical procedure known as bilateral carotid 
                     
4
.  As we recently explained:    
  
    Medicare coverage is primarily divided into two 
parts.  Part A covers all inpatient hospital expenses 
through an insurance plan.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 
  
body resection (BCBR).  The Secretary through the HCFA adopted a 
policy that "no payment [was] to be made for Medicare claims 
arising out of the BCBR surgical procedure when performed to 
relieve respiratory distress."  Id. at 607; see also id. at 608.  
Asserting jurisdiction based in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the 
plaintiffs filed suit, contending that the Secretary's policy 
violated "constitutional due process and numerous statutory 
provisions."  466 U.S. at 610.  The Supreme Court held, however, 
that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was not available, and 
the Court specifically rejected the distinction that the court of 
appeals had drawn between substantive and procedural claims.  466 
U.S. at 614-15.  "[T]o be true to the language of the statute," 
(..continued) 
1395i-4.  All Medicare-eligible patients receive this 
benefit. . . . 
 
    Part B covers certain physician services, hospital 
outpatient services, and other health services not 
covered under Part A.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j to 1395w-
4(j).  Part B coverage is not freely or automatically 
available to all Medicare-eligible patients.  To obtain 
this coverage, Medicare-eligible patients must first 
enroll in the Part B insurance program by paying 
insurance premiums ("Part B insurance premiums").  See 
§§ 1395o-1395s.  Once this is done, the federal 
government pays 80% of the "reasonable costs" of 
outpatient hospital services and 80% of the "reasonable 
charges" for physician services rendered to the 
insured.  §13051.  The Part B patients themselves must 
pay the remaining 20% of the charges for the reasonable 
outpatient hospital services and physician services 
(co-payments or coinsurance), as well as an annual 
deductible.  Id.; § 1395cc(a)(2)(A). 
 
Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Snider, No. 93-7775 (3d Cir. July 
22, 1994), slip op. at 4. 
  
the Court wrote, "the inquiry in determining whether § 405(h) 
bars federal-question jurisdiction must be whether the claim 
`arises under' the Act, not whether it lends itself to a 
`substantive' rather than a `procedural' label."  466 U.S. at 
615.   
 Turning to the case at hand, the Court concluded that 
the plaintiffs' "challenge to the Secretary's BCBR payment policy 
`[arose] under' the Medicare Act."  Id. at 615 (brackets added). 
The Court found it inconsequential that the plaintiffs "sought 
only declaratory and injunctive relief and not an actual award of 
benefits as well" because "[f]ollowing the declaration which 
respondents seek from the Secretary -- that BCBR surgery is a 
covered service -- only essentially ministerial details will 
remain before respondents would receive reimbursement."  Id.  
Instead of invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or the mandamus statute, the 
Court held, claimants wishing to challenge the Secretary's BCBR 
policy were required to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  466 
U.S. at 617. 
 If Salfi and Ringer are controlling in this case, there 
can be little doubt that the district court lacked general 
federal-question jurisdiction.  The Medicare Act provides "both 
the standing and substantive basis" for SFMC's claims.  Salfi, 
422 U.S. at 761.  Moreover, SFMC "sought . . . a judgment 
directing the Secretary to pay [Medicare] benefits."  Id. 
  
Accordingly, under these precedents, SFMC's claim "arises under" 
the Medicare Act for purposes of section 405(h).  See Ringer, 466 
U.S. at 615; Salfi, 422 U.S. at 760-61; In re Univ. Medical Ctr., 
973 F.2d 1065, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992); Abington Memorial Hosp. v. 
Heckler, 750 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
863 (1985).  Under these precedents, it makes no difference that 
SFMC asserted constitutional and procedural claims.  See Ringer, 
466 U.S. at 615; Salfi, 422 U.S. at 761. 
 B.  SFMC makes little attempt to distinguish Salfi or 
Ringer.  Instead, SFMC relies on the Supreme Court's later 
decision in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 
U.S. 667 (1986), which concerned a regulation governing payments 
under Part B of the Medicare program.  This regulation permitted 
carriers to establish separate prevailing charges for specialists 
and nonspecialists performing the same services.  An association 
of physicians and several individual doctors challenged the 
regulation on constitutional and statutory grounds, but the 
Secretary contended that "Congress ha[d] forbidden judicial 
review of all questions affecting the amount of benefits payable 
under Part B of the Medicare program."  Id. at 669.  In making 
this argument, the Secretary relied on United States v. Erika, 
Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982), in which the Court had held that the 
Medicare Act precluded any judicial review of a carrier's 
decision concerning the amount awarded on a Part B claim.  The 
  
Secretary also argued that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bolstered this 
conclusion. 
 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.  Beginning with 
"the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of 
administrative action" (476 U.S. at 670), the Court held that 
neither the Medicare Act nor 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) demonstrated with 
the requisite clarity that Congress intended to preclude all 
judicial review of "any action taken under Part B of the Medicare 
program."  476 U.S. at 673.  The Court held that the portion of 
the Medicare Act governing review of Part B determinations, as 
interpreted in Erika, "simply does not speak to challenges 
mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be 
determined rather than the determinations themselves."  Id. at 
675 (emphasis in original).  The Court then concluded that, 
whereas a carrier's decision concerning the amount of a Part B 
claim was not subject to any form of judicial review, those Part 
B matters that a carrier cannot decide -- "including challenges 
to the validity of the Secretary's instructions and regulations" 
-- are not insulated from review under the Medicare Act.  Id. at 
678. 
 As for 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), the Court wrote that it 
would not "indulge the Government's assumption that Congress 
contemplated review by carriers of `trivial' monetary claims       
. . . but intended no review at all of substantial statutory and 
constitutional challenges to the Secretary's administration of 
  
Part B of the Medicare program."  476 U.S. at 680 (footnote 
omitted).  The Court found insufficient evidence to show that 
Congress meant to take this "extreme position."  Id. 
 In subsequent cases involving Part B of the Medicare 
program, we explained that "Erika and Michigan Academy define the 
ends of a continuum."  American Ambulance Serv. v. Sullivan, 911 
F.2d 901, 905 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Medical Fund-Phila. 
Geriatric Ctr. v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 33, 38 (3d Cir. 1986).  We 
elaborated: 
 At one end are disputes over amount computations at 
issue in a particular case.  At the other are disputes 
arising from the Secretary's rules, regulations and 
instructions which are applied by the Hearing Officer.  
A Hearing Officer is not at liberty to disregard these 
rules. . . . "[M]atters which Congress did not delegate 
to private carriers, such as challenges to the validity 
of the Secretary's instructions and regulations, are 
cognizable in courts of law."  Michigan Academy, 476 
U.S. at 680, 106 S. Ct. at 2140-41 (emphasis in 
original).  
 
American Ambulance Serv., 911 F.2d at 905.  
 Contrary to SFMC's argument, we do not believe that 
Michigan Academy supports its reliance on general federal-
question jurisdiction in this case.  Michigan Academy concerned 
the availability of general federal-question jurisdiction to 
review the validity of a Part B regulation.  Under Part B, a 
carrier cannot review the legality of such a regulation (see 
Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 675-76, 680) and, as Erika held, a 
carrier's determination of the amount of a Part B payment is not 
reviewable.  Thus, if general federal-question jurisdiction had 
  
not been available in Michigan Academy, the plaintiffs in that 
case would have had no avenue for challenging the validity of the 
regulation under which their payments were calculated.  
 By contrast, the Medicare Act provides avenues by which 
a provider seeking Part A payments may contest both the amount of 
its payments and the methods by which those payments are 
calculated.  If the provider seeks review of a reimbursement 
determination and does not wish to challenge a provision of the 
Act or regulations, it may, upon compliance with the 
jurisdictional requirements imposed by statute, take an appeal to 
the PRRB (see 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1)).  Alternatively, if the 
provider wishes to challenge a provision of the Act or a 
regulation, it may seek a determination by the PRRB that the 
Board lacks the authority to decide the question (see 42 U.S.C. § 
1395oo(f)(1)) and then obtain judicial review.  See Good 
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (1993); 
Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1988). 
 Since a provider seeking Part A payments has these 
avenues of review available under the Medicare Act, the 
presumption that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial 
review, which was central to the decision in Michigan Academy, is 
inapplicable.  And in the absence of that presumption, we read 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act and as 
interpreted in Salfi and Ringer, to mean that SFMC may not assert 
its claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
  
 In Westchester Management Corp. v. United States HHS, 
948 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 
(1992), the Sixth Circuit considered a case quite similar to the 
one before us.  Noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) provided "an 
avenue of judicial review for the type of challenge that [the 
provider] assert[ed]," the court stated that "the Michigan 
Academy exception applies only when there is no other avenue of 
judicial review."  948 F.2d at 282.  The court continued: 
   Congress has expressly provided for judicial review 
of the type of claim that Westchester Management 
asserts, when the claim exceeds the $10,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement.  Congress created a special 
procedure by which a provider that, unlike Westchester 
Management, is entitled to a Board hearing may demand 
that the Board determine whether it has authority to 
pass on a relevant legal question, such as the validity 
of an instruction of the Secretary.  If it determines 
that it lacks authority, the provider may proceed 
directly to court for judicial review of its legal 
challenge.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1).  If we were 
to accept Westchester Management's construction of 
Michigan Academy -- that there is always jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 for challenges to 
instructions, rules, and regulations, but not for 
amount determinations -- this special procedure, 
created by 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1), would become 
superfluous. 
 
   The better construction requires that Westchester 
Management pursue the exclusive jurisdictional grant 
within the Medicare Act.  Its claim that it has no 
avenue of judicial review is meritless; 42 U.S.C. § 
1395oo(f)(1) provides an avenue of judicial review for 
the sort of challenge to the validity of the 
Secretary's instructions that it raises.  Westchester 
Management is, however, denied access to that avenue 
because it is unable to meet the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.  There is no contention that Congress 
lacks the power to limit jurisdiction by prescribing 
minimum amount-in-controversy requirements. 
 
  
Id. at 282-83; see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Heckler, 721 
F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1983); Frankford Hosp. v. Davis, 647 F. 
Supp. 1443, 1446-47 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Mount Sinai Medical Ctr. v. 
Sullivan, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 39,103 (D.D.C. Nov. 
30, 1990).  We find this analysis persuasive. 
 We note, moreover, that administrative remedies are now 
available for providers who believe that their base period 
operating costs are too low.  Beginning in 1990, a provider may 
request a new base period.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(b)(4)(A)-(B) 
(Supp. 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(i).  As previously noted (see 
pages 4-5, supra), a provider may also request a permanent base-
period cost adjustment under 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(g).  A denial of 
either of these requests may be appealed to the PRRB and is 
thereafter subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 
1395oo(f)(1). 
 SFMC contends that these procedures are inadequate in 
its case.  SFMC correctly notes that the granting of a new base 
period beginning in 1990 pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(i) would 
not permit it to recover the bonus payments that it believes it 
should have received prior to that date.  As for a permanent 
base-period cost adjustment, SFMC argues that the Secretary has 
only recently recognized the availability of such relief.  
Indeed, SFMC charges that the Secretary previously took the 
position that no such relief was available and that the 
Secretary's current interpretation of the relevant regulations is 
  
simply a "convenient litigating position."  The Secretary 
disputes these charges.  But whether or not SFMC's charges are 
justified, we do not think they have a bearing on the 
availability of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, for "Subject 
matter jurisdiction can never be created by estoppel."  Rubin v. 
Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 72 (3d Cir. 1984); see Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982).   
 SFMC also argues that, even now, while the Secretary 
acknowledges that a permanent base-period adjustment would apply 
in determining a provider's entitlement to TEFRA bonus payments 
in future years, the Secretary takes the position that such an 
adjustment would not apply in determining a provider's 
entitlement to bonus payments in the year in which permanent 
adjustment is granted.  In other words, SFMC contends that the 
administrative procedure may cause a provider to lose a year of 
incentive payments. 
 This argument does not persuade us that such a provider 
must be permitted to sue to recover these bonus payments under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  If such a provider has a substantive entitlement 
to these bonus payments under the Medicare Act, it is by no means 
clear to us that the provider could not obtain those payments in 
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1), irrespective of the 
regulations or the Secretary's interpretation of them.  On the 
other hand, if such a provider has no such entitlement, then 
  
obviously the Secretary's position causes the provider no harm.  
But in any event, even if the Secretary's position may by some 
means cause the provider to lose a year of bonus payments, that 
possibility is insufficient to persuade us that jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must be recognized.   
 We have considered all of SFMC's remaining arguments, 
and we find them to lack merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
decision of the district court dismissing SFMC's complaint. 
                       
